4 Theft
Theft is one of the most frequent ways museums suffer losses and may occur in a number of ways, for instance burglary after hours, removal of objects during opening hours, or stealing by employees or visiting researchers.
It will never be possible to prevent the theft of art objects entirely – after all, the whole purpose of exhibiting collections openly is so that visitors can see them close up. It is however possible to make it more difficult for criminals by putting a system of defenses in place encompassing physical, electronic and organizational measures that will enable criminal acts to be thwarted and perpetrators to be caught.
Such measures must always be tailored to the particular collection in question. Depending on the location of the building, the layout of the rooms, the value of items in the collection and the number of staff available, measures should be set out in a security policy and agreed with the building’s owner and other users. A comprehensive security policy will also take into account the proportionality of the measures, any existing defenses, and any security recommendations that can be readily implemented.
Many museums, libraries and archives hold priceless and irreplaceable collections. Given the increase in spectacular art thefts in recent years – in the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Austria and Germany – protecting collections from burglary, theft and damage is a high priority for institutions.
In comparison with other buildings or institutions, there are some key differences in the criminal threats faced by museums, libraries and archives:
- They are primarily public buildings with for the most part open access. There are rarely perimeter fences, walls or other obstructions in the way of direct access to the building.
- Those with criminal intent can often “case the joint” during opening hours to check out precisely how the object is displayed, any security measures in place and possible escape routes.
- In contrast to banks, for example, the most valuable exhibits are sometimes freely accessible, making them easy to damage or grab quickly.
- Criminals who hide and stay behind after an institution closes pose a considerable threat, since in the worst case scenario, an alarm will be not be signaled until very late and the perpetrator may be able to exit the building quickly using the “official” escape routes.
It is therefore necessary to protect collections both from burglary following forced entry to exhibition and storage areas as well as from theft or sabotage during opening hours.
Although there is no specific statistical evidence for it, it is a widely held view among experts in the field that the majority of thefts (or sabotage) occur during opening hours. They usually happen at times when there are few visitors present and in rooms where there are no attendants.
Statistically speaking, burglary is not as prevalent, but where it succeeds, the damage inflicted is much more serious. According to police statistics, over 95% of all burglaries are committed via doors and easily accessible windows.
The risks associated with each type of collection will vary. A higher risk exists for exhibits with an obviously high commercial value such as gold, valuable minerals or books than for paleontological or zoological artifacts for example.
However, security should not be organized solely on the basis of these material values – the loss or irretrievable damage to a zoological specimen is of immense cultural significance so such items should also be afforded the same protection.
An optimal security system for a building will include:
1. Physical/constructional
2. electronic and
3. personnel/organizational security measures
These measures, described in greater detail below, complement each other and should be coordinated in such a way that the risks identified are reduced to an acceptable level, people are protected, and assets are safeguarded from loss and damage.
In buildings that require a high degree of physical security, the necessity of securing areas often clashes with the need to keep entrances/exits and access routes free in order to ensure personal safety (escape routes).
When planning alarm systems, therefore, it is always necessary to carry out a risk assessment and use it as the basis for a security policy detailing the physical measures required (doors, windows, security zones, fire compartments) as well as the access needs of staff, visitors, users and cleaning personnel or maintenance contractors.
The current EN and DIN–VDE-standards (EN = European standard; DIN = German Institute for Standardization; VDE = German Association for Electrical, Electronic & Information Technologies) should be observed, along with the guidelines published by the German Association of Property Insurers (VdS) on the mechanical stability of windows and doors and on electronic security measures (intruder alarm systems). The planning, installation, operation and maintenance of an intruder alarm system should be based on VdS Guideline 2311, including all associated VdS Guidelines, the new issue of VdS Guideline 3511 “Security Guidelines for Museums & Showrooms” valid since 2009, along with DIN–VDE 0833 Parts 1 and 3 “Alarm systems for fire, intrusion and hold up”.
In the case of intruder alarm systems with a direct line to the police in accordance with the guidelines for intrusion and hold-up alarm systems, the installation must comply with Class C (the highest security grade according to VdS 2311, see “Electronic security measures, intrusion and hold-up alarm systems).
The specifications in the latest issue of the guidelines must be observed in order to ensure alarms are triggered automatically and to prevent false alarms. Any deviations from the guidelines must always be agreed with the relevant police department (usually the local crime prevention office).
Physical security measures are extremely important for preventing or delaying an attack on areas or objects of concern, while electronic measures “only” signal that an attack is taking place. Creating and maintaining a high level of mechanical resistance in the building envelope and in the individual rooms, display cases etc. is therefore an essential prerequisite for all further electronic measures.
Optimum protection from burglary and theft is provided when an attack is detected as early as possible and mechanical barriers are activated, or longer routes to the areas/objects of concern are created, in order to prevent swift execution of the theft. The time between detection (triggering of an alarm) of a break-in or theft and the successful completion of the theft is referred to as the resistance time. The longer this time, the greater the likelihood of preventing the theft from succeeding and the greater the probability of the perpetrator being caught (by security guards or the police).
I. Physical measures
Physical measures encompass all the measures taken to prevent or make it very difficult for intruders or visitors to an institution to quickly gain direct access to items in the collection.
Fences, enclosures and gates/entrances
The first physical barrier is the perimeter enclosure around the grounds. Besides the psychological effect (“private property begins here, crossing this boundary constitutes a criminal act, at least trespassing”), this barrier can be made sufficiently mechanically robust to cost the would-be intruder time and therefore increase the risk of detection.
The greater the size and robustness of the perimeter enclosure, the greater the psychological deterrence and the longer the time it will take to overcome. An optimum height is 2.5 m or higher. With smooth walls or a close-mesh fence, an intruder will then require some sort of aid to scale them. Sturdy fences must be made of at least 6 mm thick metal mesh, while the posts must be sunk to a sufficient depth in concrete and an anti-crawl barrier provided (concrete base or similar).
Security toppings along the top of the wall or fence will make it even more difficult for a would-be intruder.
If trees and shrubs are situated near to perimeter enclosures, consider whether they could be used to assist climbing.
Ultimately, every fence or wall can be scaled. To extend the resistance time as much as possible, such perimeter defenses are particularly effective when they are coupled with electronic detectors (see II. Electronic security measures). Such measures should be considered in particular if the perimeter enclosures do not meet the requirements in terms of height and robustness or cannot be altered for conservation reasons.
Building envelope
The exterior walls and roof of a building to be protected are referred to as the building envelope; any apertures in them (doors, windows, etc.) will be discussed in a separate section.
A risk assessment for the building envelope will take the following factors into account:
- Does the building stand alone or is it contiguous to an adjoining building?
- Are there apertures in party walls to adjoining buildings, is it possible to cross from one building to another over the roof?
- Does the building envelope consist of resistant materials (concrete or masonry to a suitable thickness) or easily penetrated materials (wood, half-timbering with wattle and daub)?
- How high is the building? Is there anything that would assist climbing such as lightning rods, fire escape ladders or old vines?
Since it is impossible or difficult to change the location, external form or design of an existing building for security purposes, awareness of the threats and an assessment of the risks will form the basis for electronic security measures (cf. section II). If individual structural improvements are possible (such as bricking up passageways to adjoining houses), these should be implemented.
Doors and windows
These openings in the building envelope constitute the weak spots of a building. In over 70% of cases, intruders gain access to a building through easily accessible windows.
The first thing to assess is the position of the windows and doors and how public they are (i.e. are they on a busy street or facing the rear of the building, overlooking courtyards or neighboring buildings, is the facade illuminated? etc.).
A further criterion is the height of windows above the surrounding ground. Police consider easily accessible to be up to a height of 6 m above the ground. Other risks such as elements that could assist climbing the facade, wide window ledges, balconies or cross-over points from adjoining buildings should also be considered, as these will extend the height that is easily accessible upwards.
As they act as a deterrent, grilles help to minimize risk as intruders will focus first on windows without them. Grilles or shutters that lie outside the surveillance zone protected by detectors do not extend the resistance time as they can be removed or opened relatively quickly with modern tools. By contrast, grilles with integrated intrusion detectors that signal an alarm if they are breached extend the resistance time considerably.
The mechanical robustness of the doors and windows (wood or plastic, single, double or countersash windows, hinges, catches, quality of the glass, etc.) is a particularly important factor for defeating or delaying attempted burglary.
When assessing robustness, the whole window or door element should be considered. This includes the surrounding frame and its secure anchoring in masonry, the window and door panels (including any glass sections), the position and sturdiness of the hinges and catches, as well as the locking mechanisms (see Locking system). Burglar-proof windows and doors compliant with various VdS, EN and DIN standards are available.
Physical security for individual objects
Depending on the particular artifacts and the type of presentation, objects displayed in exhibitions will require to be secured appropriately. Whether free-standing, seated on a plinth or pedestal or fixed to the wall, they should always be secured in such a way as to prevent or at least delay their speedy removal. Screws or fastenings that can only be undone with a special tool should be used.
In many cases it is possible to present artworks beyond the reach of visitors or to create such a distance by means of barriers (even simply visual ones). Display cases with a suitably high mechanical resistance offer the best protection against theft during opening hours as well as against quick smash and grab attacks during a burglary.
Locking system
In larger institutions, a master key system is usually required to control access and ensure all doors (and windows) are locked securely.
The respective keys should be distributed according to the level of access authorization, the keys issued should be documented, and it should be clearly stipulated that any key loss is to be reported immediately. If possible the master key should not be given out, or only to senior staff, and should be kept in a key safe for emergencies (e.g. a fire service key safe). No keys that allow uncontrolled access to security-relevant areas should be given to external contractors, e.g. cleaning staff.
VdS guidelines and EN and DIN standards should likewise be consulted in relation to the quality of cylinders and door hardware (e.g. VdS Guideline 2201 – “Cylinder locks”, VdS Guideline 2156 – “Locking cylinders”, VdS Guideline 2113 – “Security plates”). These formulate the quality standards products are required to fulfill with respect to defeating defenses, lock-picking (increased protection against sensing the pins in a lock) and drilling out etc. which are taken into account in the resistance classes of doors.
II. Electronic security measures
Electronic security measures encompass all technical systems that signal a break-in or the removal of displayed items, including systems permitting only authorized persons to access certain areas, systems for visually monitoring such areas and for immediately alerting a control center. They cannot directly prevent theft, but by signaling an attack on a building, protected area or exhibits, they play an important role in increasing the resistance time.
Installed electronic systems can only function effectively if all the components of a security system are integrated and planned together (as set out in the security concept above).
Intrusion and hold-up alarm systems
Irrespective of its dimensions and configuration level, an alarm system is a fundamental element of a security system. It comprises an alarm control system, transmission lines and detectors connected to the control center by means of a network of cables or a radio link.
The VdS categorizes intruder alarm systems on the basis of risk into 6 security grades (1 = lowest risk, 6 = highest risk according to VdS Guideline 2311 (planning and installation of intruder alarm systems). Based on these risk levels, tested intruder alarm systems and detectors are assigned to one of three VdS classes A, B and C. The installation of an alarm system compliant with VdS Class C is mandatory for security grade 3 and above (exceptions may be permitted by the police or the insurance company).
Owing to the risk of damage or loss, museums, archives and libraries – or at least their exhibition galleries and storage rooms or other areas with valuable cultural assets – are usually assigned to security grade 3, which requires the installation of an intruder alarm system compliant with VdS Class C.
In contrast to other VdS classes, Class C alarm systems require elevated protection against tampering and comprehensive monitoring of security-relevant functions. In addition to a material information medium (key or chip), such systems must be additionally set by means of non-physical information (PIN or code).
Intruder alarm systems in museums should always be installed by a VdS-certified security contractor. The latter is obliged to comply with the specifications in the VdS guidelines and to document this in a prescribed VdS certificate.
By connecting panic alarms (e.g. a manually activated button that sends an alarm signal directly to the police), an intruder alarm system can also be used to protect people. Intruder and panic alarm systems can either be combined or operated as stand-alone systems.
There are different types of intrusion detectors for detecting and signaling attacks on museum buildings as early as possible:
- Perimeter detectors (detection of persons approaching a building using infra-red light beams for example)
- Exterior protection (alarm signaled in response to attacks on the building envelope, e.g. monitoring the opening and closing of magnetic and bolt contacts, glass breakage or vibration detectors)
- Interior protection (sensing people moving in the building using motion detectors for example)
- Exhibit protection (protecting individual objects, e.g. artwork security systems)
Listing the individual detectors available and explaining how they function goes beyond the scope of this introduction. They are described in detail in VdS Guidelines 3511 and 2311.
Intruder alarm systems also allow different security settings depending on whether the museum is open or closed, or for different parts of the building. For instance, all detectors could be armed at night, while during the day only the areas in which visitors and staff are present are turned off. Detectors for any storage rooms that are not regularly frequented could be permanently armed and only disarmed by authorized personnel when necessary. Detectors on windows or on individual exhibits could also remain permanently armed and only disarmed for cleaning or when exhibits need to be changed.
To solve the above-mentioned conflict between having secure locked doors and the need to keep escape routes free, more and more museums, archives and libraries are using escape route security systems. These systems which open locked doors in an emergency require approval from the building inspectorate.
They can be combined both with intruder alarms to send a signal to activate door locks and with a central fire alarm system to release the locks in the event of a fire or other emergency.
Access control systems (see below) can also be integrated with an intruder alarm system, for example to grant access to a non-alarm activated area only to authorized personnel, or can be combined with video cameras to verify access authorization.
If an intrusion detector signals an attack, an alarm is triggered via the intruder alarm control center. The alarm can be sounded internally (only for in-house attendants or security guards), externally (by means of visual and audible signals to the general public, e.g. residents and passers-by) or remotely (via a data or telephone line to a police station or an alarm receiving center of a security firm). In the case of Class B and C intruder alarm systems, the VdS guidelines prescribe a remote alarm.
Access control systems
With access control systems, certain areas or rooms (such as storage areas or a security control room) can only be accessed by authorized personnel. This requires readers to be installed at doors in order to check a user’s access authorization on the basis of mechanical, electronic or increasingly also biometric data and then allow or deny access accordingly.
An access control system can also be used to record when a person enters and leaves a room, provided the respective data token is assigned to a specific person.
Video surveillance
Video technology is becoming increasingly important in museums, although only in a supporting role and not as a replacement for attendants or security guards. Visible video cameras also serve to increase the deterrence threshold. Each camera can be used to monitor the situation in key areas and the images can be recorded. They can then also be used retrospectively to review an incident and even identify perpetrators if the technology is sufficiently advanced.
Data privacy regulations must always be observed and the presence of a video surveillance system must be indicated by a sign or similar.
Key applications in museums:
- Monitoring and recording visitor traffic in order to “extend” the area monitored by staff and review any criminal activities only discovered later.
- Identifying “suspicious” visitors and evaluating incidents after crimes have been detected by handing the stored material over to the police.
- Monitoring escape routes.
- Verifying alarms: Following an alarm signal from the intruder or fire detection system, or from the video system itself (motion detectors), security guards can first ascertain the situation in the area where the alarm was triggered without having to intervene directly in person. If it turns out to be a false alarm then no personnel need be dispatched, otherwise the police can be contacted immediately.
- Instead of or in addition to perimeter security (cf. intruder alarm systems above) in the grounds of an institution using motion sensors (changes on images as a result of movement are detected and analyzed, and an alarm is then signaled if specified parameters are exceeded, e.g. “larger than a cat”).
External lighting suitable for a video surveillance system also raises the deterrence threshold for would-be intruders.
III. Personnel/organizational measures
Management is responsible for recording and assessing the risks for collections as well as for implementing the measures specified in the security policy.
To ensure comprehensive protection of artworks, personnel and organizational measures are essential for decision-making and for deploying physical and electronic security measures, for regularly monitoring their effectiveness, and for using the technology to assist security personnel.
These responsibilities include:
- Appointing a security director in charge of all security measures, their coordination and ongoing monitoring of their effectiveness, as well as for proposing suggestions for improvements.
- Training staff in extraordinary risk situations and how to deal with them.
- Emergency and evacuation plans (examples in VdS Guideline 3434 on drawing up evacuation and rescue plans for artworks and cultural assets).
- Access authorizations based on the internal structure and controlling access to minimize theft by “insiders”; specification of security zones.
- Instructions for the use of physical and electronic security equipment.
- Number and allocation of attendants and security guards and provision of a permanently attended center in-house or run by external personnel; regular training of these personnel.
- Organization of checking exhibition galleries/public areas after closing for any non-members or external people.
- Specification of relations with external personnel and their vetting (cleaning, maintenance of technical systems etc.)
- Specifications for the use of items in the collection, where available for academic research (under supervision only, coats and bags not allowed, marking with electronic book security strips, no writing implements with ink, etc.)
A complete inventory of items in the collection is one of the most important prerequisites for protecting artworks and cultural assets, and is vital after a theft to help trace items and provide evidence of their original ownership. The inventory list must be kept in a secure area protected by an intruder alarm system. Inventories on data media, or at least a backup copy, should also be stored securely (ideally off-site).