14 Violence
What do flashmobs, hooligans and terrorists have in common? They confront cultural institutions with challenges for which they are rarely prepared.
Even the end of the Cold War did not herald a time of peace and tranquility. Instead of the arms race between hegemonial superpowers, the world now faces a myriad of asymmetrical conflicts, and international terrorism is increasingly seeking “soft” and symbolic targets. Civil disorder in the form of protests or riots endanger cultural property in countries in which this was not expected (e.g. Egypt). The threat from the indirect consequences of such events is also becoming increasingly serious, i.e. prolonged periods where critical building infrastructures and communications systems are out of action.
Three fundamental threats endanger the existence of an institution, as well as the consequential problems:
- Civil disorder: demonstrations, riots, anarchy or the side effects of large events that get out of hand
- Terror: bomb threats and targeted attacks
- Armed conflict: war and civil war
Even in such extreme situations, risk assessment and emergency planning help to avert threats and minimize damage – especially if integrated in a comprehensive emergency preparedness concept.
During the Cold War, public institutions in both parts of Germany were used to considering the threats posed by conventional and nuclear weapons. Many cultural institutions had taken measures to protect their collections from air attack in particular. After 1990 this was no longer considered necessary, the prevention measures were abandoned or quietly fell into disuse. As a result of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, this perception that the threat of war had disappeared was shattered, and in response the International Committee of the Blue Shield (ICBS) was founded as an umbrella organization for the protection of cultural property in archives, libraries and museums.
International terrorism, which primarily seeks “soft” and symbolic targets, also poses a new type of threat. A re-evaluation of the threats to cultural institutions has also proved necessary in the wake of social unrest and civil disorder (e.g. Greece in 2012), or following the collapse of autocratic regimes (e.g. the “Arabic Spring” since 2011), or after natural disasters (e.g. hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005). The threat from the indirect consequences of such events is also becoming increasingly evident, i.e. prolonged periods where critical building infrastructures are out of action.
The three chief risks for cultural property are:
- Civil disorder
- Acts of terror
- Armed conflict
These can result in interruptions to critical building services and technical infrastructure.
There are essentially four types of threats to cultural property in connection with these types of violence:
- Targeted destruction or removal of cultural assets
- Tolerating the destruction of or damage to cultural assets (“collateral damage”)
- Unintentional or mistaken destruction
- Risk of property crimes (theft, grave-robbing or similar)
These latent risks are affected by numerous factors such as the domestic and foreign policy situation. Nevertheless, a cultural institution can itself also provide a trigger, for instance by mounting an exhibition or event about a controversial issue. In this difficult environment it is also necessary to realistically assess the possible consequences of any provocation.
Well thought-out precautions and emergency plans also offer a way of averting threats and minimizing damage in the face of such external and internal risks. As the starting point for a risk assessment, it is advisable to talk through such extreme situations in a small internal team. An initial idea of specific threats will be obtained and some key weak points will be identified in this way. Further steps and decisions about priorities can then be taken.
Since cultural institutions rarely have experts in emergency planning on their staff, it is expedient to consult external specialists at an early stage, both for analyzing the threats and for emergency planning. In the case of terrorism and civil disorder, the first point of call will be the relevant police authorities. With respect to armed conflict, the military will be able to provide advice.
Every institution should have an integrated emergency preparedness concept covering all the threats and their potential consequences. Although civil disorder, terrorism and war require a specific risk assessment, with respect to prevention and emergency management there are many commonalities with other threats to cultural institutions. In the case of rare and very particular threats, it is vital to be able to fall back on the solid basis of a general emergency management plan. This applies both to tried and trusted standard security measures such as for fire and theft, and to special scenarios such as the evacuation of injured people. In connection with violence, in particular the threats posed by vandalism, fire and accidental damage/building failures should also be taken into account (cf. the relevant sections of these guidelines).
1. Civil disorder
People engaged in creating civil disorder will have a wide range of belief systems and will generally be willing to commit acts of violence. These include indigenous and foreign extremists and fundamentalists, but also anti-authoritarian radicals who reject civil society or the state’s monopoly of power and who consider themselves entitled to commit violent acts. In addition there are those for whom rioting is simply an experience and leisure activity (e.g. football hooligans and “riot tourists”).
Those prepared to act violently express their rejection in demonstrations, marches and spontaneous actions. For the most part they are well organized, communicate using modern methods, and are able to quickly activate collaborators and sympathizers. Their activities frequently culminate in “politically motivated criminal acts” (e.g. assault, arson, civil disorder, robbery, civil disobedience) or general criminality such as property damage, coercion/threatening behavior or propaganda offenses. Such acts of violence are either committed intentionally or evolve from demonstrations/counter-demonstrations or protest marches, or take place on the sidelines of public events.
Generally speaking, however, any event can provide a trigger for disturbances and riots including, for instance, an exhibition by a controversial artist or an event about a controversial topic. One example is the touring exhibition on total war and the crimes of the German Army which ran between 1995 and 1999 (“Vernichtungskrieg – Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944”) and which triggered significant protests and was even attacked by right-wing extremists. Cultural institutions or projects they are involved in can therefore easily be the target of violent action. It is also possible that troublemakers will seek refuge in a cultural institution in order to escape opponents or the police. Besides such politically motivated acts, cultural institutions also need to consider the risk of large gatherings getting out of control, for instance in connection with open-air events or due to poor logistics (e.g. open days or Museum Nights). Flashmobs and fake public invitations over internet forums pose a new kind of threat.
Precautions against civil disorder
Cultural institutions should include the potential threat of, for example, a group of rioters selecting their museum or library as a venue for their protests in their risk assessment and take appropriate precautions.
To prepare for such situations, institutions should maintain good links to the authorities responsible for authorizing demonstrations or similar events. The institution will then be kept informed about applications received from risk groups and the decisions taken by the authorities. If necessary, any objections to permission being granted can also be lodged. Regular dialog with the local police authorities is also an essential preventive measure against disturbances. This contact also assists a proper risk assessment when evaluating the potential willingness of the applicants to commit acts of violence, and may prepare the way for any deployment of staff considered necessary.
If an elevated or high risk is identified, the necessary consequential action must be taken. For instance, access controls can be intensified, additional staff can be brought in through a security firm, the institution could be temporarily closed, or a planned project may even be abandoned. Applying for police assistance (e.g. additional patrols in the vicinity of the institution or even officers present in the institution itself) may also be worth considering in some circumstances. In any case, various scenarios should be discussed with experts and responses discussed so that the institution can respond to any violence with a progressive series of measures.
If, despite the preventive measures taken, violence is committed against the institution, cultural objects or visitors and staff, steps can be taken to calm the situation down again or prevent the troublemaker(s) doing further damage by de-escalating the situation, blocking off or closing unaffected areas, or ultimately alerting the police or other security forces. Whether the perpetrators and their actions should be documented for the purposes of subsequent prosecution is a matter to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
2. Terror
There is no generally recognized definition of terrorism, as it can take many forms and be motivated by many different factors. What one side considers to be terrorism, the other side may see as a legitimate act in a struggle for liberation.
Terrorists primarily seek to attack, disrupt or destroy civil order in a state and a society. They attempt to do so in spectacular ways by attacking political and business “icons”, for example buildings, symbols or people. In the medium term, attacking the core values of a society, e.g. through its cultural institutions, is also equally effective.
Cultural property is therefore considered part of the “critical infrastructure” of a country. The National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (“KRITIS-Strategie”) drawn up by German Interior Ministry states the following: “An infrastructure may possess a symbolic criticality if by virtue of its cultural or identity-giving significance the destruction of that infrastructure could cause emotional suffering and have a lasting psychological impact on the equilibrium of society” (no. 3 of KRITIS Strategy). Terrorists may not just be aiming to bring about the spectacular total destruction of a cultural institution, they may also be intending to steal or dishonor an individual symbolic object.
Acts of terrorism may be motivated by:
- Rejection of the power of the state or society
- Rejection of a specific political action (e.g. deployment of the Bundeswehr outside Germany)
- Rejection of certain social behaviors that conflict with the terrorist’s own views (e.g. homosexuality), or a specific exhibition or event deemed to be disrespectful
- An exhibition or event associated with a political or societal opponent
Precautions against terrorism
It is possible to take specific precautions to deal with bomb threats by consulting experts, specifying procedures and training staff. For staff at cultural institutions, however, it is very difficult to effectively avoid terrorist actions since it is the attacker who decides the location, time and nature of the action. The local emergency plan should therefore focus less on preventing acts of terror and more on effective measures to take in the immediate aftermath. These measures include regular and close communication with the local security services. Regular and case-based discussion groups are necessary to exchange experiences and also to evaluate projects for their potential terrorist relevance. If an elevated or high risk is identified, the necessary consequences must be taken. For instance, access controls can be intensified, the institution could be temporarily closed, or a planned project may even be abandoned.
Anti-terror strategy 1: Analyze terrorist groups
Who are the terrorists? What are their motives and goals?
- Indigenous/foreign
- Political/ethnic/religious
- Global/national/separatist/anti-minorities
- Revolution/war/extermination
Most terrorist groups have a “signature”, either by virtue of the circumstances or intentionally (e.g. for reasons of PR/image, identity/rival groups or pride/honor). This often includes a predilection for certain targets (e.g. people or objects, VIPs or ordinary people, “hard” or “soft” targets). This signature is one of the most important clues for terrorism experts who can be consulted to determine whether and in what way the cultural property in question could be in the sights of a terrorist group.
Anti-terror strategy 2: Consider the target object
There are three different threats:
- A direct attack on cultural property (building/object/people). Precaution: Risk assessment from the point of view of a terrorist group.
- The consequences of a targeted attack in the area. Precaution: Get information from the local security forces about the local threat level, precautionary measures and deployment strategies; then decide on consequences for own crisis management.
- The consequences of an attack on the infrastructure of the locality or region. Precaution: Only general precautions required.
Anti-terror strategy 3: Prepare for specific threats
The specific attack vectors of terrorists are:
- Hidden bombs (with remote detonator or trigger)
- Car bombs (in stationary or vehicles crashing into a building at speed)
- Bomb threat
- Attacks with biological or chemical weapons
- Suicide attacks
- Kidnapping, hostage-taking etc.
Cultural institutions have only very limited scope to protect themselves adequately against these specific threats with permanent measures. However, these include the tried and trusted security measures of vigilance and making criminality more difficult, for example by means of patrols at the end of opening hours, compulsory cloakroom use (coats, umbrellas etc.), spotting unaccompanied bags, locker controls (e.g. viewing windows) and video surveillance.
Other than in exceptional circumstances, the extensive security measures taken by embassies, banks or airports, such as detectors, body checks, security zones/gates, and armed personnel, are not appropriate for cultural institutions. They are expensive and extremely difficult to implement in old buildings. Moreover, such measures will impact on the well-being of visitors to a cultural institution. The same principles apply to both the simple and the complex security measures: although they are primarily intended to provide protection from other threats and form part of an overarching security concept, they also serve to protect against terrorists.
Anti-terror strategy 4: Integrated security concept
The borderline between terrorism and other extreme threats is very fuzzy. Major accidents (e.g. plane crash, collapse of a dam) or infrastructure failure (e.g. power supply sabotaged or internet denial of service attack) can also be instigated by terrorists. An institution wishing to protect itself from terrorism will therefore require an integrated security concept which takes account of its specific situation and links measures to the various specific threat scenarios (emergency management following a serious attack, in German).
3. Armed conflict
Armed conflict poses one of the most significant threats to all kinds of cultural property. Along with traditional wars between sovereign states, there are also other forms such as civil wars, wars of liberation and armed interventions, also involving paramilitary and/or private forces and mercenaries. Actors such as warlords, guerilla groups, mercenaries or terrorist networks do not subscribe to the Geneva Conventions and therefore do not pay any heed to the protection of cultural property. In the case of conflicts that are also or primarily directed at the cultural identity of the enemy, attacking cultural property can actually become the primary aim. In all other forms of armed conflicts, the threat is more incidental.
Incidental risks in an armed conflict situation are thefts, both initiated by one of the parties to the conflict (“spoils of war”) and by individuals or groups (“war souvenirs”). Another incidental threat is looting, the proceeds of which are often used to fund conflicts via the illegal art market.
Precautions against armed conflict
The current political situation in Europe makes a “conventional” war in Germany appear unlikely. Other forms of armed conflict would also appear to be improbable in the foreseeable future, but they should not be ignored in a risk analysis. Preventive measures for armed conflicts should above all cover three aspects:
- The Hague “Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict” with its two protocols.
- Evaluation of measures prepared or implemented for other risks with respect to their suitability also in the event of armed conflict.
- Consideration of additional measures to increase the security of the cultural property in the event of armed conflict.
Owing to the current threat level in Germany, more far-reaching preparations would appear to be expedient only if they are also effective against other threats.
4. Failure of critical technical infrastructure
The indirect consequences of a catastrophe, especially the failure of technical equipment and communications systems, always have a greater impact than the direct consequences. This applies to widespread natural disasters (floods, earthquakes) as well as to war, acts of terrorism and civil disorder. The failure of the infrastructure can also last much longer than after a simple accident.
For example, the floods in New Orleans in 2005 demonstrate that, even in highly industrialized rich countries, museums are by no means safe. Although hurricane Katrina only caused slight direct damage to museums as a result of the winds and flooding, in the aftermath the failure of the infrastructure and the disruption to public order created enormous problems:
- Access hindered/barred to own staff and for vital supplies
- Failure of technical services (electricity, telephone, cellular network, internet)
- Emergency generators were not designed for continuous operation (insufficient capacity and lack of fuel stores)
- The police and fire service were fully occupied saving lives and protecting vital infrastructure
- Massive outbreak of criminality and anarchy
Precautions for the failure of technical infrastructure
The disruption to operations in the wake of a catastrophe poses a major risk to cultural property. It is therefore very useful to talk through several escalating and cumulative scenarios internally in a team. Assume that your institution no longer has the use of a:
- telephone or fax machine
- telephone landline
- cellphone
- internet connection
- computer
- heating
- air conditioning system
- external power supply
- emergency power supply
- and is cut off (building/quarter/city/region)
Ask the following questions for each scenario:
- How will you become aware of the danger and how quickly?
- What are the risks to people/cultural assets/building/institution?
- What immediate countermeasures can be taken to mitigate or remove the problem?
- What precautionary measures are necessary?