The exposed public nature of an institution may mean that it is a greater risk from being attacked during a conflict situation. Threats to cultural property, so-called "soft" targets, are an increasing factor in civil wars. Since they are of great cultural significance, they are specifically attacked in order to destroy cultural identity. The same applies to terrorism targets. It is additionally necessary to include the immediate surroundings in the risk assessment. If there are any potential targets for aerial or terrorist attacks in the vicinity (e.g. barracks or fuel depots), massive ground shaking or surface fires could pose a serious threat. Major accidents should also be taken into account when assessing the risks in the institution's immediate surroundings, as an explosion at a nearby filling station or an accident on a hazardous goods transport can cause a great deal of damage.

The "Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict" (Hague Convention) of May 14, 1954 is an agreement between the contracting parties to protect cultural heritage more effectively during future conflicts. The parties were also guided by the consideration that the level of protection desired can only be achieved if the necessary measures are already organized during times of peace. The Federal Republic of Germany acceded to the convention by means of legislation enacted on April 11, 1967. Under Article 25 of the convention the contracting parties undertake to make its principles "known to the whole population, especially the armed forces and personnel engaged in the protection of cultural property".

Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Brochure

Hague Convention, German Commission for UNESCO

Owing to the relatively low risk of belligerent air attacks in Germany, institutions often have no plan for protecting themselves from air attacks, or any plan they have is now out-of-date. When drafting or updating this plan, individual elements of an earlier concept (e.g. shelters) could be incorporated. Protection from air attacks must be included in a comprehensive concept that covers all military threats.

One of the first decisions to be taken for an evacuation plan is specifying the valuable non-transportable objects. In a second step, it is then necessary to decide whether they can be protected in situ, and how this can best be accomplished (given realistic advance warning).

While it is really only advisable in regions where the earthquake risk is high to minimize the potential damage caused by objects falling over by means of permanent fixtures (e.g. soft shelf mats and shelf dividers or robust individual packing), preventing objects falling off shelves is more important because this can cause considerably more damage. What specific type of restraint is appropriate will depend on the type and size of the objects concerned. Seek the expert advice of conservators.

Openings should be located in places that are inaccessible, or at least difficult to access, for unauthorized people (high enough up or in an inaccessible place). In addition, it should not be possible to throw objects into the openings, e.g. fit protective gratings over ventilation air inlets. This will prevent the ingress of irritants (tear gas), harmful agents and hazardous substances.

A bomb threat must always be taken seriously. In this situation, written instructions setting out the first steps to take when a bomb threat is received are essential. They must be readily to hand everywhere a bomb threat could be received. In the case of bomb threats over the telephone, a voice recording device should be available to enable the police to analyze the call afterwards. If no recording device is available, it is vital to document the precise details of the call. Further steps are sealing off/securing the area, evacuating part or all of the building and notifying the police.

Procedures for dealing with bomb threats, capital city of Munich, Germany

A bomb threat is a situation that has wide-ranging consequences. Staff must therefore be trained so they are able to take the action required. This training should be carried out as quickly as possible for new members of staff (possibly through self-study), but it should also be regularly offered to all staff (once or twice a year) in order to ensure that they remain confident about the necessary action to take. Part of the training should be devoted to practicing call handling, preferably during times when there are few or no visitors.

Hostage-takers or kidnappers seek to get other people in their power in order to achieve their own objectives. If the location of the victim is known, it is referred to as hostage-taking, whereas kidnapping is when the location is unknown. Hostages are usually people who have been taken at random ("in the wrong place at the wrong time"). Kidnapping is very often targeted. Hostage-taking/kidnapping is often done in order to force you to do/not do something, or to make people aware of an issue which may or may not be connected with your institution.

Dealing with CBRN incidents is always extremely challenging. Identifying the current threat level and appropriate protective measures requires extensive knowledge that can only be acquired from specialist training. As well as its CBRN defense personnel in the military, the Federal Republic of Germany also maintains a further disaster control service that specializes in dealing with hazardous situations arising from CBRN incidents (CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear). These special forces supply trained CBRN personnel to all federal states and deliver additional specialist training at high-risk sites. For further information see the publication on core elements for hazardous situations ("Kernelemente für besondere Gefahrenlagen - Standardisierte ergänzende Ausstattung für besondere Gefahrenlagen") from the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe BBK), see link.

Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe BBK): CBRN defense

Dealing with CBRN incidents is always extremely challenging. An incident can be triggered by a terrorist or armed attack, or by an accident in an industrial plant. Deliberately instigated incidents also cannot be ruled out. The transportation of hazardous goods poses a further risk.

Contamination refers here to contamination with chemical, biological or radiological substances. It is usually very difficult to remove such hazardous substances from objects (decontamination). It is therefore vital to prevent any contamination spreading further. Contaminated objects must be placed in quarantine in order to prevent hazardous substances spreading to personnel and materials that have not yet been (greatly) affected. If necessary, separate rooms should be designated for heavily contaminated objects and those only moderately contaminated. Such rooms should not be required for routine operations and should be located somewhere that will allow easy subsequent removal of contaminated objects for decontamination.
Contaminated objects must only be handled using special CBRN procedures. If no protective measures are in place, seek the advice of CBRN specialists as regards the most expedient measures to implement in your area.

Mechanical defenses are very important in the event of threats arising from war, terrorism or civil unrest. As well as the stability of the foundations and load-bearing walls, the strength of a building's "external defenses" and consequently the level of protection they provide against attacks from outside is crucial. The objective is not only to prevent a targeted military attack, above all it is to protect the building from attacks by small bands of soldiers, terrorists, armed gangs or rioters. Since permanent mechanical reinforcement of the exterior of the building would be very costly, such measures could only be implemented as part of a large-scale renovation project. As a consequence, prevention should focus primarily on temporary mechanical strengthening of the weak points of the building's exterior, which in practice means doors and windows.

Every security policy includes electronic, mechanical and personnel measures. Since it is often the case that the power supply is disrupted for lengthy periods in the event of war, terrorist attacks or civil disorder, at some point the alarm system will also stop working. As a result, extra people must be deployed to cover security. This is a difficult matter, as for those concerned it involves taking on a degree of personal risk for which neither the cultural institution nor its insurers are usually willing to accept liability.

An emergency preparedness concept should take account of a whole range of risks. It should contain both general procedures that universally apply as well as ones that relate to specific risks. Some institutions have limited their risk assessments to natural disasters and accidents, as these are likely to happen more frequently. Nevertheless, all potential risks should be considered.